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Introduction and Background
Industrialization is occurring in
the agriculture and food sector of our
economy. Industrialization implies
many things. One is a strong relentless
trend toward fewer but larger firms in
nearly all industries within the food
production and distribution sector.
Industrializationalso implies explicit,
unavoidable, and ever-increasing inter-
dependence among firms and between
firms and government. Industrialization
inevitably increases the complexity of
society. This complexity is manifest
many ways. Sophisticated exchange
arrangements among firms which rely on
forward contracts and/or computerized
trading, world market interdependencies,
technological developments which both
create and destroy markets almost over-
night, and government concern and in-
volvement in all aspects of business
are examples of this complexity. Govern-
ment is more active in regulatory and
legislative roles at all levels--local,
state, and federal.
This paper addresses methods for
interfacing agribusiness firms and the
federal government. The objectives are
to examine the differences in regulatory
and legislative roles of the federal
government, examine methods for corporate
communication with the federal establish-
ment and finally to address the inter-
action which may exist between the method
of communication and the regulatory and
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legislative functions of federal govern-
ment.
The scope of the paper is limited
to the federal level because of the
dramatic variance in situation from one
local or state government to another.
Situations vary from relatively minimal
involvement by local or state officials
with laissez faire attitudes to activist
governments with numerous regulatory and
service bureaus. The alternatives and
need for communication with government,
at this level may be vitally important,
but depends significantly on these
situations.
For purposes of this paper, agri-
business is defined in the broadest
context as all nonfarm firms either partly
or wholly engaged in the agriculture and
food sector. Thus, agribusiness involves
firms supplying imputs at the production
level as well as the myriad of food con-
version industries between farm gate and
final consumer.
As mentioned above, the long-term
trend in number of these firms is declin-
ing. For example, the number of food and
kindred products manufacturers declined
from slightly over 41,000 to about 23,000
during the 25 year period from 1947 to
1972 (Table 1). The decline since 1963
has been at an average annual rate of
about 3 percent. As firms exit these
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
General Summary, 1972, Census
of Manufacturers, and selected
previous census years.
Fewer firms and increasing com-
plexity and interdependencyare the key
background elements which lend impetus
to the desire and need for communication
with federal government. This paper
first reviews the current status of the
theory of regulation, then examines
methods of representation of agribusiness
at the federal level, and finally con-
siders the interaction which may exist
between methods of representation and
the type of issue.
Status of the
Theory of Regulation
During the past five years a signi-
ficant increase in scientific literature
concerned with the theory of regulation
has occurred. In this literature,
economic regulation is taken to mean
government intervention in the market.
Thus, the phrase “economic regulation”
refers to subsidies of all sorts and
the impact of legislative or regulatory
functions of government. Although the
“theory of regulation” is really a
misnomer since no integrated, generally
accepted theory exists, literature
appearing in the last few years may
provide the necessary structure on which
to build such an integrated theory.
Two general tracts have been followed
to date in attempting to build a theory
of regulation. The newest is the “capture”
theory proposed primarily by Stigler and
Posner, both of University of Chicago
(2and 3). The second and eldest tract
is the “public interest” theory which is
the more widely accepted among social
scientists today. The status Qf each
tract will be reviewed briefly, although
more space is devoted to the capture
theory since it is the newest.
Capture Theory
In his recent writings, Stigler (3)
has proposed that there exist four primary
areas in which industry or occupational
interest groups may seek government
assistance, either legislatively or
through regulatory decisions at the
privilege of the executive branch. These
areas are:
1. direct money subsidy
2. control over entry by new rivals
(includingprotective tariffs)
3. actions impacting on substitutes and
complements
4. price fixing
The direct money subsidy is manifest
in terms of cash payment or loan guarantees
to individual firms or interest groups
(such as the educational establishments).
Control over entry is achieved in many
ways such as federal licensing (e.g. com-
mon carriers), patents, production or
import quotas (e.g. agriculture and oil),
protective tariffs, and the like. Actions
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and complements for a product or ser-
vice are things such as subsidies to
airports achieved through airline
industry representation. Building code
regulations which prohibit labor-
saving materials from use in construc-
tion achieved through labor union
representation is another example.
Finally, price-fixing is manifest in
items such as prohibition of interest
payments on demand deposits, direct
regulation of price through government
edict (e.g. airline industry), or any
temporary or permanent price ceiling.
The democratic political process
in the above areas is distinctly dif-
ferent from the market process in
several fundamental respects (3, pp.
10-13). Most basic is that the polit-
ical process yields a decision which
everyone must accept, unlike the market
process. The mandatory universality
of political decisions means that the
decision process must involve everyone
and not simply those directly affected
by the decision.
The essence of the capture theory
of economic regulation is that regula-
tion by government is in response to
pressure from various special interest
groups which are attempting to maximize
incomes of their members. Such theory
is based on the premise that, since
government possesses the power to give
valuable benefits to particular interest
groups, the expression of that power
may be viewed as a product whose alloca-
tion is determined by su~ply and demand
(2, p. 344). Hence, other things being
equal, the allocation of such benefit
would go to those who value it most.
The difficulty with such theory is that
it is mute on the allocation of con-
sumer protection type regulation. Cer-
tainly the allocation of this type
regulation has not historically been on
the basis of which parties value it the
most and therefore are most able to
pay for it.
Public Interest Theory
The essence of the older “public
interest” theory of economic regulation
is that regulation by government is
supplied in response to public demand
for correction of inefficient or inequit-
able market practices (2, p. 335).
Regulation of common carriers, farm sub-
sidies, and tariffs, for example, all are
viewed as governmental reaction to in-
efficiency or inequity in markets.
Whether regulation is actively sought by
industry or whether regulation is imposed,
this theory would contend that regula-
tion which occurs is primarily for the
protection or benefit of the public at
large (or at least a large public seg-
ment).
As indicated by Posner (2, p. 339),
the public interest theory is made more
palatable by observing that regulatory
agencies may be asked to perform im-
possible tasks. For example, a regulatory
agency may be directed by the legislative
branch to determine costs of regulated
common carriers and hold prices (rates)
in line with such costs. However, measure-
ment and/or control devices to effec-
tively implement such a task probably do
not exist.
The status of either theory of
economic regulation is dynamic. Either
theory obviously needs further develop-




Corporations possess political assets
of considerable magnitude. Factors such
as large-scale organization and corporate
wealth enable firms to be relatively more
effective in influencing political decisions
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society. Of course, political resources
are not synonymous with political
power. Resources represent only one
necessary ingredient of power. Also,
effective capability to translate
resources into power varies substant-
ially from one firm to another depend-
ing on factors such as corporate
managerial philosophy toward political
activity and internal organizational
structure.
There exist only two fundamental
methods for federal representation of
an agribusiness firm. One is individ-
ual corporate political involvement
through what is typically known as the
“Washington representative.” The
second fundamental method is collective
representation which involves sustain-
ing membership in an association, such
as a trade association. In practice,
of course, a corporation may employ
both types of representation.
Washington Rrepresentative
The phrase “Washington representa-
tive” may be somewhat of a misnomer
since such an individual need not have
an office in Washington, D.C., although
that is a widespread practice. The
so-called Washington representative is
an individual, usually with some exper-
ience in the employ of either the
executive or legislative branch of the
federal government, that is retained by
a corporation to represent corporate
interests at the federal level. In any
corporation, of course> there may be a
number of management personnel that deal
with government relations but such
individuals are not Washington represent-
atives. The latter individuals are
constantly ready to act in regard to
policy implications of specific cases
and situations or on a policy issue that
is not yet defined in regulations. In
short, those persons with government
relations responsibility react to legis-
lative and regulatory matters rather
than being formally assigned to corporate
representation in legislative or regula-
tory matters.
The Washington representative does
not necessarily replace or alleviate the
need for a corporation to retain a lobby-
ing specialist for a particular job. The
professional lobbyist is, of course,
oriented solely to the Congress and fol-
lows legislativematters full-time. The
Washington representative, however,
represents a corporation on both legis-
lative and regulatory matters. Indeed,
liaison with regulatory agencies of the
executive branch may consume the bulk of
the time spent by a Washington representa-
tive in representing the corporation’s
interest.
The advantage of individual represent-
ation compared to collective representa-
tion through an association is singularity
of purpose and interest that can be con-
veyed. Associations may not be able to
take concrete positions on particular
issues because of the heterogeneity of
interests among members of the associa-
tion. The disadvantage of individual
representation compared to collective
representation is primarily one of cost.
Membership in an association typically
would be less costly than retaining an
individual for which the firm pays salary
and expenses. As previously mentioned
however, many large agribusiness corpora-
tions do not see these forms of representa-
tion as alternatives but rather use both
individual and collective representation
to communicate at the federal level.
Collective Representation
Collective representation of agri-
business is manifest in two basic forms
of trade associations. These are product
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are product oriented while the latter
are oriented toward a function such as
banking or wholesaling. An example of
a pr%duct oriented association would be
the Institute of Shortening and Edible
Oils, Inc., while the National Food
Brokers Association is an example of
the functionally oriented association.
Commodity oriented associations
may be single product (e.g. corn)>
product group (e.g. grain), or cross-
product general organizations (e.g.
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives).
Of course, the breadth of representa-
tion in terms of number of firms is
greater for cross-product associations
than for single product associations.
However, heterogeneity within the group
is directly related to the breadth of
the organization also. In essence,
within group heterogeneity of interest
increases directly with the number of
firms the association attempts to
represent.
A significant amalgam in terms of
agribusiness representation at the
federal level is the Food Group. This
is an informal group designed to facili-
tate interassociation information ex-
change. The Food Group is not an
association so it represents no one nor
takes any action. However, even though
the Food Group is an information ex-
change mechanism, its individual member
associations are some of the most action-
oriented organizations representing
agribusiness. The alliance is not new
(1949) and has a history of successfully
coordinating agribusiness representation
among associations on specific issues.1
The relative frequency of occurrence
of each form of association is indicated
by analyzing 1976 Food Group membership.
Using the product and functional class-
ifications outlined above, each 1976
member of the Food Group was categorized
exclusively into one or the other depend-
ing on the association’s primary orienta-
tion (Table 2). Of the association mem-
bers, 76 percent were product oriented
while only 24 percent were functionally
oriented. Total membership of the Food
Group was 84 with 64 of these being
product oriented associations. “
Within the product oriented classi-
fication, 52 percent were associations
with a single product orientation, 42
percent were product category oriented,
and only ,6percent were cross-product
oriented. ~is tabulation indicates a
significant propensity toward single
product or product category associations
rather than broad multi-product associa-
tions.
Within the functional category, 30
percent or 6 associations were general
functional such as wholesaling or banking.
Another 35 percent, or 7 associations,
were service oriented such as associa-
tions representing consultants, state
Departments of Agriculture, or land-grant
universities. Another 25 percent, or 5
associations, were retail oriented while
10 percent, or only 2 associations, were
oriented toward hotel, restaurant, and
institution representation.
In the aggregate, the 1976 Food Group
clearly is composed of a preponderance of
product oriented associations rather than
functionally oriented associations.
Within the product category, associations
are predominantly single product oriented
or product category oriented.
Interaction Between Method of
Representation and Type of Issue
Regulatory versus Legislative
Communication between agribusiness
firms and federal government is a function
of the type of issue under consideration.
For example, there exists a broad inherent
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*Does not add due to rounding error.
Source: Computed based on 1976 Food
Group Directory.
difference between regulatory and legis-
lative issues. tigislative issues tend
to be of wide impact and tend to have
more universality than regulatory issues.
Contrast this to a regulation issued by
an executive branch agency which tends
to more specific and narrow in its impact
on agribusiness. For example, legisla-
tion establishing the Environmental
Protection Agency to promulgate cleaner
air and water is an issue which has
wide impact on business and consumers.
However, an EPA regulation may be issued
which involves specific guidelines for
the amount of particulate allowed in
waste water discharge from a certain
food processing plant or type of pro-
cessing facility. The point is that
there is a tendency for regulatory issues,
on the average, to be of more narrow
focus and impact than legislative issues.
The consequence of this inherent
difference between regulatory and
legislative issues is that the affected
segments of the agribusiness community
tend to differ substantially. Also,
regulatory issues tend to have direct
and distinct economic impact on an
individual corporation while legislative
issues tend to have less direct and more
vague economic impact on an individual
corporation. In actuality, a continuum
exists for both regulatory and legisla-
tive issues which runs from specific,
direct economic impact on a small number
of individual firms (e.g. Federal Trade
Commission action against four cereal
manufacturers) to indirect, vague economic
impact on all firms (e.g. inflation or
unemployment legislation). The functional
relationship between specificity of issue
and number of firms concerned is important
however.
On broad, general issues more homo-
geneity of position tends to exist among
corporations with respect to the issue.
These are also the issues that tend to
have indirect and vague economic impact
on particular firms. The converse is
that as issues become more direct and
specific in economic impact the fewer
the number of firms that are concerned
with the issue and more heterogeneity of
opinion tends to exist among corporations
with respect to the issue.
Another distinction between legisla-
tive and regulatory issues is that the
loci of power is relatively more diffuse
with regard to legislative issues. Regula-
tory issues, emanating from agencies
within the executive branch, tend to have
a specific locus of power. In fact, for
most regulations currently operating, not
only can a specific executive branch agency
be pinpointed as in charge, but typically
a specific individual within that agency
has designated responsibility for the
regulation. Compare this to a typical
legislative issue where the locus of power
is spread (albeit unevenly, perhaps) over
535 legislators.
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legislative and regulatory issues is
that legislative issues are relatively
slow in formation and transformation
into new law. Regulatory issues, how-
ever, tend to be much swifter in forma-
tion and transformation into a new
regulation. Regulations can be nearly
instantaneous (e.g. ban on cyclamates)
and are, in general, more susceptible
to swift transformation into new rules.
This means the gestation period on
legislative issues tends to be longer
which allows more time for formation of
definitive positions by individual
corporations and more time to evaluate
the extent of direct impact on an in-
dividual corporation of alternative
resolutions to any particular issue.
Interaction
Given the propensities of legisla-
tive and regulatory issues discussed
above, the interaction between type of
issue and the optimum method of repre-
sentation becomes quite apparent.
Multi-product associations would tend
to be the optimum method for corporate
representation of broad, general issues.
As the issues become less broad and
more specific, the smaller less heter-
ogeneous associations, such as the single
product associations, become the optimal
method for representation of corporate
interest. Finally, with regulation or
legislation that may have direct and
specific impact on one or only a few
firms, the Washington representative
becomes the optimal method of representa-
tion.
Associations with a large number
of members typically are restrained from
taking definitive action or a definitive
position when the issue is specific and
may only impact on a small segment of
that association’s membership. Due to
the heterogeneity inherent in a large
number of members, consensus cannot be
gained which would allow the broadly
based organization to take a definitive
position on a specific issue. Another
factor,whichmay prevent definitive posi-
tions by large associations on specific
issues is that privileged information may
need to be revealed in, for example, a
regulatory issue in order to adequately
represent the position of an individual
corporation. For competitive reasons, a
firm may refuse, or at least be reluctant,
to turn such information over to an
association.
In summary, expected effectiveness
of various methods of representation or
communication varies substantially by
type of issue (Table 3). Conmmnication
and effective representation of an individ-
ual corporation’s interest could be
expected to be greatest through a Washing-
ton representative for specific issues of
direct economic consequence to the fimn.
Also, for issues of broad, indirect
economic impact, greatest effectiveness
in representation of an individual cor-
poration’s interest would be expected
through a multi-product association or
other large coalition. Conversely a
Washington representative would be expected
to be relatively ineffective in repre-
senting individual corporate interests on
broad issues. Representation through a
large coalition with respect to specific
issues would be expected to be relatively
ineffective also.
An alternative way of formalizing
this general relationship is to relate
expected costs and gains incurred by an
individual corporation to the size or
membership of any particular coalition
(Figure 1). To generalize even further
the preceding relationships, the expected
direct economic impact on an individual
firm would be.expected to be inversely
related to the size of a given coalition.
For example, a specific OSHA regulation
may have a direct adverse economic impact
on textile mills through a noise pollution
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Figure 1. Plausible Relationship
Between Type of Issue and








standard. The direct economic impact on
firm i may be relatively great and spec-
ifically measurable but affect only a
small number of firms. Hence, the coali-
tion concerned with the regulation is
small. The converse is (say) a legisla-
tive bill to promote employment or control
inflation which may have relatively minor
direct economic impact on firm i but
relatively homogeneous positions exist
among firms with respect to the issue.
Hence, the coalition is relatively large
but the expected direct economic impact
on firm i is relatively small.
Summary and Implications
The need for communication and
representation at the federal level has
increased over time as agribusiness firms
have become fewer in number but larger
and as society becomes more complex. As
this industrializationprocess increases
the complexity of society, corporate
political involvement at all governmental
levels will likely become more intense.
No one method of representation of indivd-
ual corporate interest is likely to be
adequate. A significant interaction
exists between the expected effectiveness
of the method of representation and the
type of issue. Large coalitions tend
to be optimal for broad issues of indirect
economic impact on specific firms while
smaller coalitions or individual repre-
sentation tends to be optimal for specific
issues of direct economic impact. Expected
direct economic impact of legislation or
regulation on individual firms is sug-
gested to be inversely related to the
expected size of a coalition.
Footnote
‘For an example of such a coordinating
effort with regard to the Hart “Truth in
Packaging” Bill see Hall (1, p. 166).
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